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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge
Appellant Michael Maguire (“Maguire”) appeals the District Court’s September 
10, 2010 judgment of conviction, sentencing him to a term of 42 months of 
 
 2 
imprisonment, followed by 4 years of supervised release with special conditions, and his 
apportioned amount of restitution of $9,500.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we shall recount only the 
essential facts.   On September 3, 2009, Maguire was indicted on a one-count charge of 
possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and § 2.  On 
February 1, 2010, Maguire pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement with the 
government.
1
  On February 1, 2010, Magistrate Judge Shwartz took Maguire’s plea.  
After concluding that Maguire’s guilty plea was “knowing, intelligent and voluntary,” 
Magistrate Judge Shwartz submitted a Report and Recommendation (R&R) to the 
District Court.  The District Court adopted the R&R, and accepted Maguire’s guilty plea.   
On June 11, 2010, the Probation Office prepared a pre-sentence investigation 
report (PSR), recommending a total offense level of 28 based on: (1) a base offense level 
of 18; (2) a two-level enhancement, because the material involved prepubescent minors 
and minors under the age of 12; (3) a four-level enhancement, because the offense 
involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct; (4) a two-level 
enhancement, because the offense involved the use of a computer; (5) a five-level 
enhancement, because the offense involved the possession of 600 or more images of child 
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 The plea agreement did not stipulate to a Guidelines calculation.  However, Maguire 
agreed that: (1) the images he possessed involved prepubescent minors and minors under 
the age of twelve years old; (2) the offense involved the use of a computer; and (3) the 
offense involved 600 or more images of child pornography.  Maguire also admitted to 
these facts at his plea allocution. 
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pornography; and (6) a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  Maguire 
had no criminal record before this conviction, resulting in a criminal history category I.  
The advisory Guidelines range was 78 to 97 months of imprisonment. 
At sentencing on September 7, 2010, Maguire did not request any downward 
departures.  He did request that the District Court grant him a substantial variance from 
the advisory Guidelines range and sentence him to one day of imprisonment and a ten-
year term of supervised release, instead of the PSR’s suggested sentencing Guidelines 
range of 78 to 97 months of imprisonment.  The District Court sentenced Maguire to 42 
months of imprisonment.  Maguire filed a timely notice of appeal.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
A district court’s sentencing procedure is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007).
 
  On abuse of discretion review, the court of 
appeals gives due deference to a district court’s sentencing decision.  Id. at 51.  District 
courts have discretion when sentencing and appellate review is limited to determining 
whether the sentence imposed is reasonable.  Id.  Our appellate review proceeds in two 
stages.  It begins by ensuring that the district court committed no significant procedural 
error, such as (1) failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines range; (2) treating the Guidelines as mandatory; (3) failing to consider the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; and (4) selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or 
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failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence and to include an explanation for any 
deviation from the guidelines range.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc).  If the district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it 
unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.   Id. at 568.   Then, at 
stage two, we consider a sentence’s substantive reasonableness.  Our substantive review 
requires us not to focus on one or two factors, but on the totality of the circumstances.   
At both stages of our review, the party challenging the sentence has the burden of 
demonstrating unreasonableness.  Id. at 567.  (Internal quotations marks, brackets, and 
citations omitted). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 Maguire argues that his sentence is both procedurally flawed and substantively 
unreasonable, because the District Court failed to properly consider the 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) factors.  Maguire specifically contends that the sentence was procedurally flawed 
because the District Court failed to address his policy arguments related to § 2G2.2 and 
failed to discuss what role the additional non-Guidelines information he provided, 
including an expert report, played in the determination of the final sentence.  Maguire 
also argues that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the District Court, 
after failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, imposed a sentence that was unnecessarily 
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punitive under the facts and the nature and circumstances of his case.
2
 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), sentencing Guidelines are no longer deemed mandatory.  Instead they are deemed 
advisory.  Since Booker, district courts are required to follow a three-step process in 
determining the appropriate sentence in this advisory scheme.  “Courts must continue to 
calculate a defendant's Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have before Booker.  
In doing so, they must formally rule[e] on the motions of both parties and stat[e] on the 
record whether they are granting a departure and how that departure affects the 
Guidelines calculation, and tak[e] into account [our] Circuit's pre-Booker case law, which 
continues to have advisory force.  Finally, they are required to exercise [their] discretion 
by considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors, in setting the sentence they impose 
regardless whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the Guidelines.”  United 
States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  The sentencing courts are statutorily required to state their reasons for 
imposing a sentence, although a comprehensive, detailed opinion is not required.  Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).  The sentencing court must provide an 
explanation that is sufficient to satisfy the appellate court that the district court 
considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own 
decision-making authority.  Id. 
                                                 
2
  The pertinent § 3553(a) factor is the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant. 
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Maguire contends that “in pronouncing the final sentence, the district court largely 
limited its discussion to the two enhancements it declined to apply to the sentence.  The 
district court did not discuss how the academic reports, case law or the Sentencing 
Commission’s own reports impacted the sentencing process.”  (Appellant’s Reply Br. 
11.)  
Although the District Court did not comment on the policy argument in its final 
sentencing statement, the record indicates that the District Court acknowledged the 
argument, entered into an extensive colloquy regarding the argument, and then ruled.  
There is no requirement that the District Court provide an exegesis on all issues raised 
before rendering sentence.  There is no error. 
Maguire next contends that the District Court failed to properly consider all of the 
§ 3553(a) factors.  The District Court thoroughly considered the sentencing factors.  The 
District Court first discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense, and found that 
Maguire’s conduct involved downloading and viewing child pornography and that it was 
an “abhorrent, horrible, detestable crime,” and that the impact on the victims is 
irreparable.  (J.A., Vol. II, 84.)  The District Court noted Maguire’s history and 
characteristics, stating that it did not think Maguire would reoffend and acknowledging 
that he was suffering as a result of this crime.  Then, the District Court considered the 
impact of Maguire’s actions on the parents of the victims, on Maguire’s own family, and 
on the people victimized by child pornography.  The District Court noted that in 
determining a fair sentence, it must “weigh the bad and the good.”  (Id. at 86.)  Next, the 
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District Court discussed deterrence, requiring Maguire to undergo treatment in a mental 
health program and to have his computer equipment subject to unannounced 
examinations.  The District Court also ruled that Maguire could not have any collections 
of films, slides, pictures, tapes, videotapes or any form of pictorial representation, 
involving minor children of either sex.   
The District Court discussed the need to appropriately punish Maguire for his 
crime, and inquired whether similar cases existed, and what the judgment was in those 
cases, in its efforts to come up with a “fair and just sentence.”  (J.A., Vol. II, 82.)   The 
District Court also addressed the need for restitution, and required that Maguire pay 
$9,500 as a share of the $379,000 total restitution to be paid to one of the victims of his 
child pornography offenses.  
Finally, the District Court addressed the importance of protecting the public, and 
prohibited Maguire from having any contact with children of either sex under the age of 
18, without the express approval of the probation officer.   The District Court also 
prohibited him from obtaining employment or doing volunteer work which involved 
contact with minor children, without the express approval of the probation officer.   
The District Court expressed its concern as to what constituted fair punishment for 
Maguire and that it tried to “look at the varied characteristics of him personally, at - - you 
know, in terms of will he re-offend.”  (Id. at 84.)  The District Court stated specifically 
that it had taken into account all of the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and 
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circumstances of the offense.  (Id. at 82-90.)   The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion. 
The substantive component of a reasonableness review requires the appellate court 
to take into account the totality of the circumstances.  United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 
214, 217 (3d Cir. 2009).  Although the appellate court considers the extent of any 
variance from the advisory Guidelines range, it must also give due deference to the 
district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the 
variance.  Id.  The substantive reasonableness of each sentence must be evaluated on its 
own terms, based on the reasons that the district court provided, in light of the particular 
facts and circumstances of that case.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 574.  In examining the totality 
of the circumstances, we determine whether a reasonable court would have applied the 
same sentence as the District Court.  See Lychock, 578 F.3d at 219 n.2.   
The District Court refused to add certain enhancements to Maguire’s sentencing 
Guidelines calculation.  The District Court’s actions in Maguire’s case are similar to 
those in United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010), where the district court 
found that most of the enhancements were essentially inherent in the crime and applied in 
nearly every case.  Therefore, the District Court held that the sentencing range 
recommended by § 2G2.2 would not be applied and could not be given deference.  Id.     
Here, when the advisory sentencing range was initially calculated in the PSR, the 
base offense level was 18.  A 2-level enhancement, under § 2G2.2(b)(4) was added, along 
with a 4-level enhancement, under § 2G2.2, a 2-level enhancement, under § 2G2.2(b)(6), 
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and a 5-level enhancement, under § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D).  Three levels were subtracted for 
acceptance of responsibility.  This added up to a total offense level of 28.  Maguire had 
no criminal history, which resulted in a criminal history category I.  The Guidelines 
advisory range for Maguire’s criminal history category and offense level was 78 to 97 
months.  The District Court rendered sentence – 42 months. 
The District Court declined to apply the two-level enhancement for use of a 
computer under § 2G2.2(b)(6) or the five-level enhancement for the number of images 
discovered on his computer under § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D), thus reducing Maguire’s total 
offense level from 28 to 21, and reducing the Guidelines advisory range from 78 to 97 
months, to 37 to 46 months.  With regard to § 2G2.2(b)(6), the District Court stated that 
“these crimes always involve a computer, and therefore it is almost de facto, not de jure, 
but de facto become - - - that the use of the computer is synonymous with the crime.”   
(J.A., Vol. II, 81.)  Regarding the enhancement for the number of images, pursuant to § 
2G2.2(b)(7)(D), the District Court stated “the number of images doesn’t reflect intent any 
longer, because the click of the mouse can result in many more images than anybody ever 
really perhaps wanted.  Although he has them.  But I don’t view that as making the crime 
worse in this case, the number of images.”  (Id.)   
The sentence imposed on Maguire was substantively reasonable.  The District 
Court provided a detailed and considered explanation for its decision to grant a variance, 
as evidenced by the record, and reflected its consideration of the totality of Maguire’s 
circumstances.  In choosing not to add the enhancements, the District Court explained its 
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intent to sentence Maguire only for the crime he committed and not add automatic 
enhancements, which did not really reflect a specific crime, but which it viewed as being 




The District Court properly calculated the Guidelines range, treated that range as 
advisory, considered the § 3553(a) factors and did not base its sentence on clearly 
erroneous facts.  The District Court explained the reasons it was concerned about § 2G2.2 
at sentencing, engaged in a sustained colloquy with both parties regarding § 2G2.2 policy 
issues, and then explained why it selected the sentence it did.  Because the District Court 
undertook meaningful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, we find no procedural error 
in sentencing Maguire.  The District Court considered the totality of the circumstances in 
imposing its sentence.  The sentence imposed by the District Court was substantively 
reasonable.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of conviction of the District Court.  
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  Maguire argues that his ultimate sentence should have been lower because, given the 
District Court’s refusal to apply certain enhancements, the total offense level was much 
lower than had been anticipated.  As such, a true variance, according to Maguire, would 
have proceeded lower than the ultimate Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months.  This 
argument has no merit.  The District Court pronounced a sentence within the appropriate 
Guidelines range and in accord with Gunter.  No further departure or variance need be 
calculated or rendered. 
